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DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE: 
TOWARD LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
COOPERATION 
Donald R. Bessler 
I. Introduction 
There seem to be increasing claims of a 
growing need for cooperation between labor 
and management, especially in the United 
States. However, is this need real or merely 
perceived? Several "reasons" have been prom-
ulgated for the development of a "workplace 
democracy." Increasing competition from 
foreign sectors poses a threat to U.S. 
dominance in world markets, resulting in calls 
by management for labor concessions and calls 
by the public for product quality improvement. 
The growing "world economy" creates in-
creased interdependence among countries as 
each nation realizes that its "sovereignty" may 
not be all that sovereign. Along similar lines 
and as mentioned above, consumers are con-
tinuing to demand increased quality and 
dependability from the products that they pur-
chase as the world marketplace increasingly 
brings merchandise from around the world to 
America's doorstep. 
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But what is workplace democracy, anyway? 
Is it workers' control? Self-management? Labor-
management quality of work life (QWL) com-
mittees that analyze jobs, proposing and 
designing changes in the workplace? What are 
the goals of the programs involved: total 
management of the enterprise, an opportunity 
to affect policy, or factors that impinge upon 
workers in the daily performance of their jobs? 
Today's discussions of participatory 
management generally distinguish between 
three goals: economic, political-managerial, 
and social. Who is it that owns the organiza-
tion and is entitled to the proceeds accruing 
from its operation? Who is it that governs the 
organization: that is, what types of structure, 
operations, and decision-making methods exist 
within the firm? And finally, who has access to 
either of these components, ownership and 
governance? 
Although workplace democracy tends to 
be thought of merely in terms of blue-collar 
workers, it should be kept in mind that many 
individuals with managerial titles or responsi-
bilities are often relatively powerless within an 
organization. With respect to the levels above 
them, they, too, are "just workers." It seems, 
then, that worker democratization should also 
encompass those involved in white-collar and 
professional work. 
What is the role of unions in workplace 
democracy? As Kanter and Stein point out, 
"The instinct of economic survival and the 
need of workers to protect economic livelihood 
has been the primary function of unions" 
(Zwerdling, p. ix). There is a need to break 
down the traditional adversarial relationship 
between labor and management (or at least to 
modify this relationship substantially). Some 
union leaders recognize this need and realize 
that unions must take on additional roles if the 
goals of workplace democracy are to be met. 
However, will the changing roles of unions 
result in their becoming unnecessary or ob-
solete in the future? Also, what exactly are the 
roles that organized labor should play in the 
development of workplace democratization? 
This paper begins with a description and 
definition of the concept of "workplace democ-
racy" and proceeds to analyze this concept ac-
cording to the major examples of workplace 
changes described in the literature. The paper 
then concludes with a brief discussion of the 
raison d'etre of unions and the response of 
union leaders to this idea of "workplace 
democracy." 
II. Types of Workplace Democracy 
What does "democracy at work" really 
mean? The ways in which corporations have 
changed the workplace vary drastically. In 
some companies, employees have limited 
power over their daily jobs while workers in 
other companies have the power to change the 
corporation. Some workers have gained the po-
tential to effect changes, perhaps in the near 
future. The following sections discuss work-
place democracy as it has manifested itself in 
five major areas: humanization of work, labor-
management committees, co-determination, 
worker ownership, and workers' self-manage-
ment. 
L_______________________ -- -- --
2 
A. Humanization of Work 
In the early 1970s, several social research 
studies proclaimed that Americans were bored 
with their jobs and felt alienated in the work-
place. As Work in America, published by the 
Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, stated, "Significant numbers of 
American workers are dissatisfied with the 
quality of their working lives. Dull, repetitive, 
seemingly meaningless tasks ... are causing 
discontent among workers at all occupational 
levels" (O'Toole, p. 3). These dissatisfactions 
led to decreased productivity, as evidenced by 
"absenteeism, turnover rates, wildcat strikes, 
poor quality products and a reluctance by 
workers to commit themselves to work tasks" 
(O'Toole, p. 3). 
To alleviate this growing worker dissatis-
faction, attempts to bring about the "humani-
zation of work" subsequently appeared. 
Workers' needs to interact with managers and 
with each other and how they felt about their 
work began to be considered. The emphasis 
was upon the social design of the workplace. 
Therefore, as managers "humanized" the work 
process, giving employees greater autonomy 
and control in the production process, workers 
would become more satisfied with what they 
were doing and less disgruntled. 
Toward this end, corporations across the 
United States have been "11umanizing" their 
white- and blue-collar factories. A General 
Motors factory, for example, has eliminated the 
traditional assembly line approach and has 
given small worker teams the power to as-
semble entire mobile homes on their own, 
thereby removing the boredom and repetition 
involved with typical "one-task" assembly-line 
jobs. Corning Glass has encouraged workers to 
have "coffee with the boss" and weekly "rap" 
sessions with department heads. In this way, 
employees would feel less alienated and more 
involved with the corporation. At a General 
Foods' Topeka dog food factory, traditional 
foremen have disappeared, replaced by "auton-
omous worker teams" that have taken respon-
sibility for directing the daily production proc-
ess (Zwerdling, p. 3-4). 
How does this "humanization of work" fit 
into the concept of workplace democracy? It 
has been shown that workers' increased auton-
omy and power over their jobs does boost 
employee morale, worker satisfaction, and pro-
ductivity. However, it must be kept in mind that 
these programs still exist within the larger cor-
porate framework of higher management 
directing lower-level workers. That is, workers' 
activities and goals exist within the much larger 
context and control of upper-management goals 
and policies. Therefore, the traditional power 
relationship remains unchanged. The manage-
ment of corporations implementing humaniza-
tion programs indicates that the primary goals 
of such programs are to increase productivity 
and profit, with increased worker satisfaction 
being merely a means to this end. 
B. Labor-Management Quality of Work 
Life Committees 
Similar to the "humanization of work" 
process is the development of joint labor-
management quality of work life (QWL) projects 
being implemented in unionized companies 
across the nation. The goals are similar: to in-
crease autonomy and power of workers over 
their jobs, thereby making their work lives 
more satisfying and improving the quality of 
their work projects. However, these labor-man-
agement projects come closer to actual work-
place democracy by allowing workers to par-
ticipate with management in controlling and 
designing the changes under QWL projects. It 
is a process of democratic decision-making. 
The United Auto Workers-General Motors 
Quality of Working Life program is perhaps the 
most famous (and successful) of these projects 
to date. The project had its origins in problems 
which arose in the late 1960s: increased absen-
teeism, growing disciplinary layoffs, and rising 
grievances. A job-satisfaction survey taken in 
1968 indicated a need for change. To this end, 
in 1973 the U A W and GM created a joint com-
mittee on improving the quality of working life. 
In 1975, the company and the union held the 
first of several national conferences on QWL, 
with neither side being very specific as to what 
QWL meant; rather, plant managers and local 
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union officials were urged to meet in good faith 
and "work something out." In 1979, GM re-
quired all plants to have a QWL program; how-
ever, once again, the specific content was not 
defined. 
The initial results of QWL efforts appear to 
be quite positive. Absenteeism is declining, as 
are grievances. The number of settlements in 
plant-level negotiations over supplemental con-
tracts that occur before the settlement of the 
master UAW-GM contract has risen dramatical-
ly. These developments indicate an increased 
willingness on the part of the local union offi-
cials and local managers to at least work at 
solving their problems. GM also reports some 
increases in quality and cost-effectiveness of 
production (Mills, p. 592). 
The unique and significant aspect of the 
UAW-GM arrangement is not the reorganiza-
tion of work or greater employee participation; 
rather, it is the involvement of union and man-
agement in a joint effort. This indicates an 
attempt to extend the concept of collective bar-
gaining beyond the confrontation of the nego-
tiating table and beyond the adversarial at-
mosphere which so often accompanies griev-
ances and arbitration. This, in turn, results in 
labor relations which are less conflict-ridden 
and perhaps better adapted to the protection of 
employees' jobs and living standards in an in-
creasingly competitive international market-
place (particularly in the automobile industry). 
Many other examples of quality of work life 
programs exist beyond that of the UAW-GM 
project. At the Rushton Mining Company, the 
management and union desired increased safe-
ty without decreased productivity while 
smoothing troubled labor-management rela-
tions (Business Week, 1976, p. 28E). The man-
agement and union at the American Sterilizer 
Company in Jamestown, New York, formed a 
QWL project to achieve increased efficiency 
and productivity to escape the threat of layoffs 
(Zwerdling, p. 5). Other labor-management 
projects have strived for more far-reaching 
goals, such as stimulating the personal growth 
and development of employees. 
In general, labor-management quality of 
work life committees give employees increased 
influence over the workplace while allowing 
them to learn to analyze their jobs, think criti-
cally about work, and assist fellow employees to 
improve production processes and solve prob-
lems. However, as with humanization pro-
grams, the traditional balance of power 
between management and workers remains un-
disturbed. 
C. Co-Determination 
In Western industrial countries, most ma-
jor decisions on the future of firms and on 
workers' livelihoods are not made on the shop 
floor. In the hope of participating in these deci-
sions, workers have sought representation on 
company boards of directors. 
The "co-determination" system constitutes 
one of the most important forms of employee 
participation in management. Pioneered by 
West Germany and practiced mainly in that 
country, co-determination falls short of a fully 
self-managed system; however, it is claimed to 
be one of the most advanced systems of em-
ployee control in the Western world. 
"Co-determination" involves the appoint-
ment of workers' representatives to the board 
of directors of an organization. Its essence is a 
partnership of owners and labor in the opera-
tion of an enterprise. In Germany, firms have 
two separate boards-a supervisory one that 
sets company policies and a management one 
that handles day-to-day affairs. Each group of 
workers is represented on the supervisory 
board; the chairman is selected by manage-
ment and always casts the tie-breaking vote. 
Although this may suggest that labor is always 
in the minority, it appears that most board 
decisions are made by consensus. 
German management's initial fears about 
sharing responsibility and authority with labor 
have proved groundless. A 1970 government 
commission concluded that there had been no 
loss in earnings or investment as a result of 
labor representation nor any abuses of confi-
dence by labor's board representatives (Stokes, 
p. 22). In addition, it seems that the unions 
have not used their new position to obstruct 
decision-making. 
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The concept of co-determination has be-
come very popular in Europe. By law, the 
boards of directors of companies in Scandina-
vian countries must include workers. In 
France, although they may not cast votes, 
workers send two representatiyes to meetings 
of corporate boards. In the' Netherlands, a 
unique system of co-determination has 
developed: corporate / boards " renew" 
themselves from a l~st of candidates jointly ap-
proved by labor _and management, thereby not 
insuring labor representation but giving unions 
some veto power over the composition of the 
board. Great Britain is also moving toward in-
cluding workers on boards of directors (Stokes, 
p. 23). 
However, in the United States, formal 
worker representation on boards of directors is 
opposed by most labor leaders. Most union 
leaders see worker participation as an attempt 
to eliminate the historically successful adver-
sary role of American labor. They feel that any 
"blurring" of the distinction between labor and 
management will undermine their negotiating 
position, weaken workers' confidence in their 
union, and decrease membership. Manage-
ment, like union leaders, also contends that 
labor representation on boards of directors is 
inappropriate. The general feeling is that such 
representation would be divisive and ineffi-
cient. 
Consequently, while board participation 
seems "a long way off' in the United States, 
perhaps the successful European experience 
with co-determination may soon encourage 
progressive American companies to experi-
ment in this area. 
D. Worker-Owned Companies 
Workers purchasing their own corpora-
tions has become much more common during 
the past decade. However, it is important to 
realize that worker ownership is not necessarily 
the same thing as worker control. There are dif-
ferent kinds of worker ownership, each giving 
workers access to varying degrees of control. 
First, workers can own their workplace by 
becoming members of a producer cooperative. 1 
An often-cited example exists in the American 
plywood industry. Eighteen plywood manufac-
turing firms in Oregon and Washington are ful-
ly owned by their employees and, to varying 
degrees, are also managed by them (Bernstein, 
p. 13). These companies make up about one-
eighth of the American plywood industry. The 
organization of the plants varies from one to 
another, but all reflect the same general proc-
ess. Employee-shareholders meet annually to 
elect from their own members a board of direc-
tors. The board makes most policy decisions, 
but its power is checked by the whole group. 
The board of directors hires a general manager 
to coordinate daily affairs. He is the company's 
expert on business matters and usually comes 
from outside the firm. The governing process 
in the plywood mills is therefore based on a cir-
cular pattern of authority: the workers hire the 
general manager, set his salary, and make all 
major decisions on company expansion, mod-
ernization, etc.; however, on a day-to-day basis 
they work under the general manager's direc-
tion. Worker-owners are free to walk into the 
general manager's office-with complaints or 
suggestions. Participation remains at a high 
level. 
In this case, much of the success or failure 
of the worker-owned mill depends upon the 
general manager; he requires sound business 
sense and the ability to present his views to the 
directors convincingly. It appears, however, 
that considerable productivity is "released" by 
the self-management process that outweighs 
any inefficiencies of self-management. Worker-
owned mills have consistently demonstrated 
higher productivity than at conventionally-
owned firms (Bernstein, p. 18-19). One major 
reason that self-management is able to succeed 
in the plywood industry is that the manufactur-
ing process is labor intensive and requires 
relatively low levels of capital. (This suggests 
which industries offer the greatest chances of 
success for worker-owned enterprises today: 
the service sector or retail trades.) Another fac-
tor important to these firms ' success is ease of 
market entry-the earliest collective began 
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when the market was first devel ping. Still, it is 
important to note that producer cooperatives, 
more than any other enterprise in the U.S. to-
day, are not only worker-owned but also 
worker-controlled. 
A second way that workers can own their 
own firms is by buying common stock on the 
open market. An example is the Vermont As-
bestos Group (VAG), purchased by the mine's 
workers from GAF Corporation in 1975. The 
miners purchased the organization when it was 
in trouble, then proceeded to make a profit and 
ensured a stronger economic base for their 
depressed community. VAG survived for three 
years as a worker-owned firm; however, when 
the book value of the common stock rose from 
$50 to $2103 per share over t at period, the 
employees voted to sell their shares to a private 
owner (Nightingale, p. 228). In this second type 
of worker-owned company, workers exert less 
power than do workers in co-ops because out-
side individuals can also purchase stock. Usu-
ally, managers with high salaries and large 
financial resources purchase m re shares and 
cast more votes than do the blue-collar workers 
on the production line. 
The third way in which w rkers can be-
come owners of their firms is by establishing an 
Employee Stock Ownership Pia (ESOP). This 
results in the least degree of worker control of 
all three methods discussed. Under an ESOP, 
an employee has an account that is credited 
with contributions made to the plan by the 
company in proportion to the employee's level 
of compensation. Upon retirement or termina-
tion of employment, the ESOP account is 
translated into the stock of the company. 2 
ESOPs are becoming increasingly popular for 
1 Producer cooperatives are to be distinguished from 
consumer cooperatives. In the latter. profits are distributed 
to customers as a dividend on purchases instead of to 
shareholders as a dividend on shares. Producer coopera-
tives produce a product or provide a service . and members 
involved in a productive role in the organization are con-
sidered as members. The surplus is distributed to the mem-
bers. not to customers. The essence of the producer 
cooperative is significant employee ownership of the enter-
prise . 
2Employees may also be able to enjoy the voting 
privileges of their common stock once uesting requirements 
are met. 
several reasons. First, the employees become 
owners of the company as stockholders, and 
many employers feel that this will increase 
employees' productivity. Second, employees 
receive additional compensation in the form of 
the ESOP contributions, which are not taxed 
until the ESOP accounts are converted into 
stock. Third, certain tax benefits allow an 
employer to raise capital by the establishment 
of an ESOP. Usually, however, the amount of 
stock which each employee receives is based 
upon his or her salary. This means that those 
with higher compensation (e.g., managers) re-
ceive more shares. In addition, at most firms 
that have established ESOPs, the workers will 
never get the power to vote their own stocks. 
Instead, the stock votes in these worker-owned 
firms will be controlled by management-ap-
pointed committees. Workers at such com-
panies, therefore, have little potential for ac-
tually controlling their workplace. 
E. Workers' Self-Management 
The types of workplace developments dis-
cussed above have all given workers more in-
fluence over aspects of the corporate structure 
than they have had before. However, except for 
the case of cooperatives and co-determination, 
the traditional corporate power structure re-
mains intact. 
The final major workplace development-
workers' self-management-completely reverses 
the typical corporate power structure, however. 
Under workers' self-management schemes, the 
workers control the entire organization. Advo-
cates of workers' self-management contend that 
it is the only long-term solution to problems of 
the workplace and argue that it is necessary for 
psychological, ethical, and democratic reasons. 
Perhaps the most important argument for 
self-management, however, is a more pragmatic 
one. According to advocates, unless workers 
control their enterprise, they will not have 
guaranteed protection against the abuses of 
management. Workers at "humanized" work-
places can ask management for certain conces-
sions, while workers in companies with labor-
management projects can negotiate through 
collective bargaining (or, if necessary, strike). 
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However, only workers in a self-managed com-
pany can actually shape the firm to their needs. 
Researcher Paul Bernstein has delineated 
five characteristics of a self-managed organiza-
tion that are required for successful operation 
(Bernstein, 1980, p. 45). They include: 
• Participation in decision-making. 
• Frequent feedback of economic results to 
all employees (in the form of money, not 
just information). 
• Full sharing with employers of mana~e­
ment-level information and, to an increas-
ing extent, management-level expertise. 
• Guaranteed individual rights. 
• An independent board of appeal in case of 
disputes (composed of peers as far as possi-
ble). 
Bernstein finds that if any of these com-
ponents are absent, then employees' willing-
ness to participate is difficult to maintain. As a 
consequence, the firm is unlikely to experience 
democratic management for very long. 
III. What Labor Thinks 
When advocating self-management, or any 
other form of workplace democracy, a seeming 
paradox results: most leaders of the American 
labor movement are not heading the effort to 
democratize work, but seem to resist it. The 
concerns expressed by labor leaders include: 
(1) the fear of "selling out" by conceding the 
traditional adversarial relationship between 
labor and management, (2) the belief that such 
workplace democracy proposals are merely 
"dreams" which will result in a reality of little 
success and a lot of failure, (3) the feeling that 
workers will sooner or later become managers, 
and this will result in pitting worker against 
worker, and (4) the belief that such proposals 
are the invention of intellectuals who do not 
recognize the realities of the American work-
place. 
Why does the U.S. labor movement op-
pose the push toward workplace democracy? 
Or, does the U.S. labor movement really op-
pose it? To understand some of the different 
perspectives presented by labor leaders on the 
debate of "workplace democracy," it is useful 
to recall how the American labor movement 
evolved. Although "worker control" has long 
been heatedly debated in many European 
countries, it has rarely been an issue of the U.S. 
labor movement. Although small factions ad-
vocating self-management have always existed 
in the U.S. labor movement, most of these fac-
tions, and the companies they spawned, have 
died a quick and painless death. By 1900, the 
American labor movement was synonymous 
with the American Federation of Labor and 
such leaders as Samuel Gompers. Leaders such 
as Gompers argued that workers should 
develop strong trade unions which would con-
cede to management the right to direct the 
workplace but which would devote their 
energies to demanding various concessions in 
return. Although workers would not exert any 
direct control over the workplace, they would 
have the ultimate power of being able to stop 
production completely (by going on strike) to 
win the concessions they wanted. This system 
became known as "collective bargaining," and 
by 1940 virtually all of the major unions had 
joined the collective bargaining movement 
under the direction of either the AFL or CIO. 
As this attitude on the part of the unions 
took firmer hold, so did management's in-
sistence on its prerogative to control funda-
mental issues concerning what to produce and 
how to produce it. It became management's 
sole responsibility to determine the products to 
be manufactured, the location of plants, the 
schedules of production, the processes of 
manufacturing, and the administrative de-
cisions relating to financial , marketing, pur-
chasing, and pricing areas. 
As perceived by most union leaders, then, 
the unions' fundamental role has been and con-
tinues to be that of organizing workers and rep-
resenting them in collective bargaining in order 
to gain certain limited rights and tangible 
benefits. 
A. Union Leaders' Concerns About Work-
place Democracy 
With this background it becomes easier to 
understand many union leaders' worries about 
recent developments in the workplace. They 
tend to oppose "humanization" efforts for 
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several reasons: 
• They feel that it is an attempt on the part 
of management to destroy the union or to 
keep workers from joining a union. Hu-
manization makes workers feel that 
management cares about them, and, there-
fore , they will not feel the need for a union 
to protect them. 
• Leaders also claim that humanization is 
merely an effort to increase workers' pro-
ductivity without correspondingly increas-
ing workers' salaries. Management merely 
satisfies workers With supernCial benefits, 
rather than with anything more substan-
tial. 
• Benefits from humanization are never 
guaranteed; management can retract 
benefits just as easily as it provides them. 
Another workplace reform opposed by 
union leaders is "co-determination"-the plac-
ing of workers on the corporate board of direc-
tors. Union leaders have voiced the following 
fears: 
• By placing workers on the board of direc-
tors, the distinction between management · 
and labor will gradually disappear, destroy-
ing the traditional labor-management ad-
versarial relationship. The fear is that 
workers will become "seduced" to manage-
ment's point of view. 
• If union representatives do join the board 
of directors, they will most likely receive 
most of the blame for mistakes while re-
ceiving little credit for successes. 
Many union leaders also fear that workers 
and their unions could be weakened if they own 
their own enterprise. They reason that workers 
may lose their identities, and soon, instead of 
workers managing workers, it will again be 
management managing workers. In addition, 
they contend that the workers may develop 
such a competitive spirit that they will argue 
among themselves over corporate profits. On 
the other hand, some union leaders also point 
out that most of the firms sold to workers are 
only marginally surviving in the first place. How 
will the workers/union be able to save it? 
In regard to the worker self-managed firms 
(such as the plywood co-ops), most union 
leaders have expressed no opinion. Some actu-
ally think such ventures are unrealistic, while a 
few union leaders view such cooperatives as a 
threat to the very existence of the unions. What 
need, they ask, do self-managed firms have for 
unions? 
B. Unions in Support of Workplace 
Democracy 
Although we have seen that many union 
leaders oppose these different types of work-
place changes, increasing numbers of union 
leaders are advocating other reforms which 
give added power and freedom to workers. 
The most common of these are the labor-
management ''quality of work life" projects. As 
described earlier, these are special committees 
designed to bring union, management, and 
worker representatives together at various cor-
porate levels. These committees do not advo-
cate self-management, worker representation 
on the board of directors, or worker ownership. 
Rather, they aim to create a forum which en-
courages workers, along with management, to 
analyze their jobs, raise questions about any 
aspect of their employment, and assist in the 
design of changes for the betterment of the 
workplace. All of these are issues that would 
probably not appear in a collective bargaining 
contract. 
Unions are participating in and encourag-
ing these committees for several reasons, not 
the least important being self-preservation. 
Union leaders reason that, if management pro-
ceeds with workplace democracy while unions 
resist it, workers may lose faith in their unions. 
If, however, unions take the initiative in this 
regard, they may be able to better earn the 
respect of their members. Yet another reason 
for union support of QWL projects is that an 
increasing number of union leaders see such 
developments as a natural and logical progres-
sion in labor-management relations. Such pro-
grams are viewed as a way to gain more union 
power and strength. Union leaders feel that 
such projects strengthen the unions in the col-
lective bargaining process by encouraging 
union members to become more active partici-
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pants in union affairs. In this regard, advocates 
of these programs stress that such committees 
should not replace the traditional labor-man-
agement adversarial relationship but should 
add another dimension by which the union and 
management can cooperate. In other words, 
although issues of economic security will re-
main adversarial in nature, questions of work-
place democracy should be undertaken as a 
joint effort in the spirit of cooperation. 
One form of workplace democracy that is 
increasing in popularity is the Scanlon Plan. 
This plan is used by some firms as a method of 
rewarding employees of a company as a whole 
for exceptional performance. It is not a profit-
sharing or incentive plan; rather, it is a "cost-
savings sharing plan." Most incentive plans 
(group or individual) have severe limitations. 
With individual incentives, each worker is in-
terested in completing his or her own job as 
rapidly as possible, regardless of the conse-
quences this performance has on others. Con-
sequently, production quality may decrease as 
employee conflicts increase, with each worker 
"working for himself." The end result can be 
decreased productivity and increased costs. 
Out of this state of affairs developed the 
Scanlon Plan. The plan has three basic ele-
ments: (1) a philosophy of cooperation, (2) a 
suggestion system designed to incr~ase effi-
ciency and reduce costs, and (3) a formula 
which permits bonuses to be paid to employees 
based upon cost savings resulting from produc-
tivity increases. Key to the success of the plan is 
the philosophy of cooperation-from top man-
agement to the lowest level worker. The mech-
anism for cooperation is departmental produc-
tion committees comprised of both employees 
and management. These committees make sug-
gestions for improvements, but management 
reserves the right of implementation. The 
bonus paid out is calculated using the following 
"basic ratio" (Mills, p. 454): 
B . R t' Total personnel costs as1c a 10 = Sales + Inventory changes 
If the plant achieves a lower ratio, cost sav-
ings result which are distributed to the com-
pany and workers in proportion to their normal 
salaries. This plan thereby encourages em-
ployees to increase productivity and reduce 
costs, providing a surplus to be distributed as a 
bonus. Through the Scanlon Plan the company 
can benefit from higher efficiency and lowered 
production costs, individual workers can bene-
fit from higher take-home pay, and stockhold-
ers can benefit because higher efficiency and 
output increases total company profits and, 
eventually, dividends. 
Although one of the most interesting and 
sophisticated labor-management plans devel-
oped to date, the Scanlon Plan is in successful 
operation in only a relatively small number of 
companies. Perhaps this is because the plan re-
quires a willingness to experiment with a new 
and challenging kind of relationship between 
labor and management. In addition, the plan 
requires greater effort and more attention than 
most companies and unions are willing to give. 
In any case, it is important to recognize that 
the Scanlon Plan can open up a whole new area 
of cooperative labor-management relationships 
in a democratic and dynamic society. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has examined five of the major 
recent developments in workplace democracy: 
humanization, QWL committees, co-determin-
ation, worker-owned companies, and workers' 
self-management. Although self-management is 
the most radical development in that it reverses 
the traditional corporate power structure so 
that the workers are in control, labor-manage-
ment quality of work life projects seem (for the 
present, at least) to be the most popular and 
least resisted by both management and organ-
ized labor. Even so, these projects remain con-
troversial within the labor movement. 
Some union leaders fear that such projects 
can "drain" union energies on superficial 
issues. Others worry that such committees 
could acquire enough responsibility to make 
certain union officials obsolete. Still others feel 
that, if effective, these labor-management proj-
ects could eliminate the workers' desire for 
unions altogether. 
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However, advocates of the programs con-
tend that these fears are unfounded. Risks in 
such projects are more the result of the hap-
hazard and careless manner in which the proj-
ects are established. In order fo r these projects 
to succeed, management and labor must com-
mit themselves to the long-run development of 
the worker. 
Worker participation projects, no matter 
how superficial, are the beginning of funda-
mental change in the workplace. Whenever 
workers analyze their jobs, discuss issues with 
management, or jointly decide upon workplace 
changes, they acquire increased understanding 
of the firm and begin to see possibilities for 
change where none existed before. Eventually, 
labor-management committees may generate 
worker demands to take part in management. 
Greater employee participation in decision-
making is not the only solution to the problems 
of employee dissatisfaction at work. Needless to 
say, job security, safe working conditions, and 
better pay remain major concerns of workers. 
However, great progress could be made-not 
only in employee satisfaction, but also in the 
more effective and efficient use of human re-
sources-by extending participation in the 
workplace. As Donald V. Nightingale states: 
Democratic practices would release human 
talent and ingenuity which are currently 
held in check by unchallenging jobs, 
authoritarian supervision, and a workplace 
which places little value on employees as 
creative, responsible, and autonomous 
human beings (Nightingale, p. 194). 
Certainly, as America enters a period of 
worldwide economic change, the organization 
of work, relationships between management 
and labor, and economic development strate-
gies will be affected. New styles of labor-
management relations can provide greater op- · 
portunity for economic progress and develop-
ment, thereby contributing to the solution of 
employee dissatisfaction at work and the com-
plex economic problems of the 1980s. 
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